

Guide to Counterintelligence-relevant Reporting

The Department of Energy (DOE), in compliance with various laws and executive branch directives, has implemented a Counterintelligence (CI) program that includes requirements for employees and contractors to report certain CI-relevant information to their Counterintelligence officers. These reporting requirements are intended to help counter the ongoing efforts of foreign intelligence services, particularly those of “sensitive” countries, to collect sensitive and classified information from the DOE.

The requirements recognize that foreign intelligence services often foster professional and personal relationships as a means to elicit or otherwise obtain desired information. Accordingly, we seek to obtain certain information about your professional, personal and financial relationships with citizens of sensitive countries. We also ask that employees and contractors report unusual requests for information by unauthorized individuals, and that they also be alert to (and report) CI-relevant anomalies.

The policies described in the preceding text and in the following matrix take into consideration previously issued requirements, such as the “Close and Continuing Contact” reporting requirement included in the CI Implementation Plan. Relevant portions of these earlier requirements have been included; other parts that are no longer deemed relevant have been discarded.

If a relationship has not evolved to where you would naturally know if an individual is a sensitive country foreign national, and it would be unnatural to ascertain, do not do so. **The DOE is not tasking you with gathering information on individuals.**

Circumstance or Situation	Is Reporting Required?		Explanation
	With Sensitive Country Foreign National	With Non-sensitive Country Foreign National	
Professional Relationships			
Contacts and relationships established in the course of accomplishing DOE goals and objectives, whether at ones work site or abroad	Yes	No	May be included in trip reports or other formal but routine documentation of professional activity with both sensitive country foreign nationals and others. May also be captured during debriefings with a CIO
Foreign monetary support is provided for travel to another country	Yes	Yes	Whether or not the support is provided by a sensitive country foreign national, and whether or not the destination is in a sensitive country, the foreign monetary support must be reported.
Personal Relationships			
Substantive personal relationships with other than family members	Yes	No	A “substantive” relationship is one that is enduring and involves substantial sharing of personal information and/or the formation of emotional bonds. By “enduring” we mean a relationship that has lasted (or is expected to last) for months or years. By “substantial” sharing of personal information we mean discussion of “private” information about oneself (that one would not routinely share with strangers, for instance). By “emotional bonds” we mean feelings of affection or attachment. Because these criteria are necessarily subjective, we must rely on your best judgment as to when reporting is required.
Substantive personal relationships that take place in “cyber space” (e.g. exchanges of email or conversation in an Internet chat room)	Yes	No	Reporting is required when thresholds for “enduring” and “substantial” relationships are met as described above.

Financial Relationships			
Business associates or other financial relationships	Yes	No	Any significant financial relationships or transactions, but not including routine payments made by personnel for domestic or commercial services such as maid service or other <i>non-live-in</i> domestic help. Also does not include financial support provided to family members.
Unusual Solicitations			
Attempts by unauthorized persons to gain access to classified information	Yes	Yes	PDD/NSC-12 requires employees to report <i>any</i> requests by unauthorized persons for classified or otherwise sensitive information. The requirement to report is not limited to sensitive country foreign nationals, or even just foreign nationals, but rather attempts by any unauthorized person, even U.S. citizens.
Situations that appear to be attempts by foreign intelligence services to enlist cooperation	Yes	Yes	Employees are required to report suspicions that they may be targeted by a foreign intelligence service. For instance, if a traveler is asked to take a sealed package across borders, this could be an attempt by an intelligence service to compromise the employee by a subsequent “discovery” of contraband in the package.
Attempts to seek sensitive or classified information about your workplace, your official responsibilities and/or activities and/or identities and activities of coworkers	Yes	Yes	Solicitation, by a foreign national or anyone else, of classified or sensitive information they are not entitled to requires reporting.
Anomalies	Yes	Yes	Foreign power activity or knowledge, inconsistent with the expected norm suggests foreign knowledge of U.S. national security information, processes or capabilities.

The Insider Threat: Espionage Indicators

Examples	Explanation
Unexplained Affluence	Living beyond one's means indicates hidden income or wealth. Many coworkers of convicted spies have, in retrospect, identified this as something they were aware of but did not report.
Unusual Foreign Travel	Odd travel schedules and locations may be an indicator. For instance, periodic short (weekend) trips to Mexico City when there are no reasons for such travel.
Unusual Work Schedules	While we recognize that this may simply indicate that the employee is a dedicated and hard working person, it is also true that in many cases of espionage we have subsequently established that the person took advantage of the relative isolation afforded by odd work hours to copy or procure classified material.
Attempts to Obtain Information	Asking for sensitive or classified information that is outside one's need to know. Could be an attempt to gather information to satisfy tasking by foreign intelligence service.